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CURTIS EATON,* ALLAN INGELSON**&
RAINER KNOPFF**

Property Rights Regimes to Optimize
Natural Resource Use -Future CBM
Development and Sustainability""
ABSTRACT
Property rights regimes that promote sustainabledevelopment in
the context of coalbed methane (CBM) exploration and production
recognize and optimize the value of multiple natural resources
including minerals, water, flora, and fauna. Institutional
mechanisms thataccountfor and mitigate both the short-and longterm external impacts from CBM development promote
sustainability. The long-term potentialfor a vibrant recreational
and touristeconomy on a particularlandscapemay be compromised
by overly shortsightedmineral resource extraction.
INTRODUCTION
As in the United States, coalbed methane (CBM) is a promising
source of energy in Canada. "More than 6,000 NGC [natural gas from coal]
wells have been drilled in Alberta, the focal point for NGC activity in
Canada since 2001 ....
By 2025, unconventional gas is expected to account for
about 80 per cent of new drilling activity and 50 per cent of total gas
production in Canada."' The Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (EUB)
anticipates that by the year 2025 80 percent of the wells drilled in the
province will be CBM wells, with CBM accounting for 50 percent of the total
marketable gas.2
This article examines issues posed by Canadian CBM development
in light of the U.S. industry experience and examines property rights
regimes that promote sustainable development through the optimal use of
natural resources.
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1. Mike Dawson, An Unconventional Future for Natural Gas Supplies in Canada, in
UNCONVENTIONAL GAS: THE FUTURE BEGINS 8[51 (proceedings of the eighth annual conference
of the Canadian Society for Unconventional Gas, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, Nov. 2006).
2. Id.
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THE EMERGING CBM INDUSTRY IN CANADA
Though active exploration exists in British Columbia,
Saskatchewan, and Nova Scotia, Alberta is the only Canadian province in
which considerable commercial CBM production has been reported as of
January 30, 2006.3 The Energy and Utilities Board (EUB) anticipates that
CBM production in Alberta will increase from approximately "21 billion
cubic feet (bcf) in 2004 to 539 bcf in 2014, an increase from less than 0.5% of
the total marketable gas production to approximately 12%" within a
decade.4 Figure 1 shows coal zones of potential interest for CBM production
The coal zones contain the following potential CBM resource-inin Alberta.
5
place:
Zone
Horseshoe Canyon
Mannville
Scollard Formation (Ardley Coal Zones)
Belly River Group (Lethbridge, Tabor and
Mackay Coal Zones)

Potential CBM in trillion
cubic feet (tcf)
66
320
53
66

The central challenge of CBM exploration and production is one of
"sustainable development." 6 The definition of sustainability in the
Brundtland Report that has been frequently quoted is "development that
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs."7 Sustainable development prompts
the government to consider solutions relevant to new policies, laws,

3. Jeffrey Fiell, Opportunities in Coalbed Methane: Economic Upside for Investors 12-15
(Octagon Capital Corp., Jan. 30, 2006) (based on work completed by the Alberta Geological
Survey and Alberta Energy & Utilities Bd.).
4. Id. at 15. Most of the CBM production in Alberta to date is from the Horseshoe
Canyon Formation in an area located east of Highway No. 2 between Edmonton and Calgary.
In central Alberta, commercial production has also been reported from wet coals in the
Mannville Group.
5. Id. at 14-15.
6. Notwithstanding previous references to sustainable development, the term was
popularized in U.N. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT & DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON
FUrURE (also known as the Brundtland Commission Report) (1987) [hereinafter OUR COMMON
FUTURE].

7. Id. at 43. The Brundtland Commission Report has prompted action to manage the
development of natural resources including the conservation and optimal use of those
resources to protect the quality of life for current and future generations.
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relationships, and participation to create changes for an improved future.8
For example, the Alberta Government, through the Department of
Sustainable Resource Development, has publicly confirmed its commitment
to "the wise management of Alberta's natural resources and environment
for the benefit of Albertans now and in the future."9
Our analysis of the CBM development challenge in the context of
sustainability will proceed in six stages. First, this article briefly reviews
some of the major environmental and social issues triggered by CBM
development. Second, the article outlines a conceptual framework for
analyzing the problems, focusing on "externalities" or "external effects" of
development to provide the best uniform understanding of the challenges
associated with CBM development. Third, two kinds of external effects localized and diffused, which pose distinct issues and invite different
solutions-are distinguished. In sections four through six, three kinds of
solutions are discussed: property rights, stakeholder consultation, and
voluntary contingent taxes (VCT). The first two (property rights and
stakeholder consultation) exist in regulatory schemes but could be
considerably improved. The third (VCT) represents a promising addition
to the policy mix.
IMPACTS OF CBM
In Canada as in the United States, the CBM industry is emerging to
replace dwindling conventional natural gas reserves." The American CBM
development experience in the last two decades provides a useful context
for anticipating and managing issues that will arise in Canada. In its
analysis of the environmental impact of CBM production on water
resources, the U.S. Geological Survey in 2000 reported that "scientific
understanding of, and production experience with, coal-bed methane are
both in the early learning stages. Much is yet to be learned... about the
environmental implications of developing the resource." 1
In several states in the western United States, ground water is
drawn from aquifers to facilitate CBM production, creating potentially
damaging environmental consequences. A study published by the
University of Colorado in 2002 noted that CBM development "may affect

8. Id. at 308-10.
9. Ralph Klein, Foreword to ALBERTA ENERGY, ALBERTA ENV'T & ALBERTA SUSTAINABLE
RESOURCE DEv., ALBERTA'S COMMITMENT TO SUSTAINABLE RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT1 (1999), http://www.srd.gov.ab.ca/srem/pdf/1999_Commitmentdocument.

pdf.
10. Dawson, supra note 1.
11. Vito Nuccio, Coal-Bed Methane: Potential and Concerns, U.S. Geological Survey, FS123-00 (2000).
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underground water quantity and contaminate aquifers, underground water
supply may be diminished as dewatering occurs, groundwater may be
contaminated by mineral-laden discharged water, and local ecosystems
may be12adversely affected by the surface release of large quantities of
water."
Some landowners, ranchers, and environmental groups in the
western United States have expressed concerns about the impact of CBM
exploration and production on water quality and the volume of water that
will be available for future use in ranching and agriculture. 3 The surface
discharge of water produced by CBM development can cause erosion that
floods sediment into rivers and interferes with fish reproduction. 4 When
the water contains minerals it can also interfere with plant growth."5
Furthermore, water produced from CBM wells may cause aquifer and
potable well contamination, endangerment of wildlife from produced water
discharges, destruction of wildlife habitats and ecosystems, and increased
erosion from produced water discharges.
Methane migration is another problem accompanying CBM
development in the western United States. The U.S. Geological Survey
(USGS) has reported that methane can migrate from CBM wells through the
soil or water into areas overlying coal seams, and in some areas methane
may contaminate groundwater resources.
Methane migration into residential neighborhoods has created
significant public outcry. 6 In response to residents fearful of the potential
for methane explosions in and near their houses, the USGS and the
Wyoming Geological Survey completed a risk assessment in the Rawhide
Village Subdivision in Campbell County, Wyoming. 7 The government
agencies confirmed that the migration of CBM created a hazard for
residents and the subdivision was abandoned.

12.

Gary Bryner, Coalbed Methane Development in the Intermountain West: A Primer, in

COALBED METHANE DEVELOPMENT IN THE INTERMOUNTAIN WEST 2 (University of Colorado

School of Law, 2002), available at http://www.colorado.edu/law/centers/nrlc/CBM_
Primer.pdf.
13. See, e.g., Press Release, Northern Plains Resource Council, Montana Irrigators Ask
State to Limit Salinity, Sodium Pollution (June 25, 2002).
14. Thomas F. Darin & Amy W. Beattie, Debunking the Natural Gas "Clean Energy" Myth:
Coalbed Methane in Wyoming's Powder River Basin, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,566, 10,579 (2001).
15. Gary Bryner, CoalbredMethane Developmentin the IntermountainWest: Producing Energy
and Protecting Water, 4 WYO. L. REv. 541, 543, 546 (2004).
16. Nuccio, supra note 11; CBM/NGC MULTI-STAKEHOLDER ADVISORY COMMITTEE,
COALBED METHANE/NATURALGAS IN COAL: FINAL REPORT 29-30 (2006), http://www.energy.
gov.ab.ca/245.asp; Kate MacNamara, Fighting Off Another Invader: FirstIt Was Thistles, Now
It's the Gas Trapped in Coal, NAT'L POST (Don Mills, Ontario), Aug. 21, 2004, at FP 1.
17. Nuccio, supra note 11, at 2.
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Beyond the impacts on water resources and the potential for
methane migration, some landowners and residents have objected to land
surface impacts of CBM development. Such impacts are similar to those
arising from conventional oil and gas development and include land surface
disturbance from new roads, drill pad sites, water disposal sites, and other
facilities. But because CBM development usually requires the drilling of
more wells in a smaller area than conventional oil and gas production,
traffic and vehicle noise levels, noise from compressors, and air pollution
are more intense. The increased number and density of wells and the
corresponding larger number of compressors and pumps for CBMproduced water and to pressurize the methane can result in elevated noise
levels.' 8 Venting and flaring of uneconomical volumes of gas as part of a
pilot testing program to determine the economic viability of production
from CBM wells is a practice that has been employed during the initial
dewatering of coal seams."
Even though CBM offers exciting new opportunities for energy
development in Alberta, it also poses new challenges that may not be
effectively addressed by the regulatory and property rights regimes
designed for conventional gas. First, in certain fields, the development of
CBM entails significant issues of produced water extraction, disposal, and
purification. Even though to date most of the commercial CBM production
in Alberta has been from "dry" coals that have produced negligible
amounts of water, recent exploration and development indicates that wet
coals in some areas of the province contain large volumes of CBM, and for
that reason there is concern about the environmental impact from CBM
development on this vital resource. 20 Second, the time profile for pilot
testing CBM wells is frequently longer than in the case of conventional gas
wells. Third, drilling spacing units are smaller and well densities
significantly higher, ranging from two to eight CBM wells per section, as
compared with the common spacing of one well per section for
conventional natural gas. Fourth, the magnitude and spatial extent of the
resource, combined with the possibility of higher well densities, raises the
possibility that full development of the resource might fundamentally and
permanently alter the landscape of Alberta in undesirable ways.

18. See Bryner, supra note 12.
19. Venting and flaring have prompted complaints from landowners about noise and
safety. See EUB, EnerFAQsl0: Coalbed Methane, http://www.eub.ca/portal/server.pt/
gateway/PTARGS 0_0260t222_043/http%3B/extContent/publishedcontent/publish/e
ub-home/public-zone/eub&process/enerfaqs/enerfaqslO.aspx.
20. See Kelly Cryderman & Renata D'Aliesio, Farmers,LandownersVoice Oppositionto Coal
Bed Methane, CALGARY HERALD, June 19,2006, at A6; Renata D'Aliesio, Inventory of Water Too
Slow, CALGARY HERALD, June 26, 2007, at B6; Hanneke Brooymans, Government Urged to Meter
Rural Well-water Use, EDMONTON J., June 26, 2007, at B5.
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Given the more dramatic environmental and economic issues posed
by this new energy source, it behooves the government to take the time to
carefully sort through the institutional mechanisms best suited to managing
the difficult tradeoffs among their alternative futures. Alberta and British
Columbia landowners, ranchers, and environmental groups have
responded with concern about the impact on water quality and the volume
of water available for other uses in ranching, agriculture, and consumption.
Media coverage about the environmental impacts from CBM development
has been significant in Wyoming, Montana, Colorado, and New Mexico.
How are the parties to this issue to understand and deal with this complex
panoply of issues prompted by the emerging CBM industry? The next
section provides a framework.
AN ECONOMIST'S PERSPECTIVE-REGULATING CBM
DEVELOPMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
The language of "sustainable development" is de rigueur almost
everywhere these days. No doubt, this language has become so popular
partly because it has proven to be vague and flexible enough to serve the
rhetorical purposes of "agencies with vastly different goals" and to support
"a wide variety of policy decisions from a given set of facts." 2 At a
minimum, however, sustainable development entails the intergenerational
criterion of "meet[ing] the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs."' In other words, the
portfolio of assets constituting Alberta's natural resources must be
maximized for the net benefit of Albertans, present and future. From the
perspective of economics relating to the disciplinary approach presented
here, this requires institutional mechanisms that can account for and
mitigate both the short- and long-term external impacts of any particular
kind of development.
"External impacts" are effects on other interests in the relevant
neighborhood that, in the absence of carefully crafted property rights or
regulation, will not be properly taken into account by the developer but that
must be factored into any overall accounting of economic and social wellbeing. Overall well-being, in short, means taking into account not only the
direct and immediate economic benefits of proposed developments- say,
the extraction of subsurface commodities-but also the full costs and

21. BRUCER. PARDY, ENVIRONMENTLAw:AGUIDETOCONCEPTS267 (1996). See also JAMES
OTro & JOHN CORTES, THE REGULATION OF MINERAL ENTERPRISES: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE ON
EcONOMICS, LAW AND POLICY 8-40 (2002).
22. OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 6, at 43.
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benefits of alternative choices, including alternatives that might be
foreclosed to future generations by the "external effects" of current
proposals. For example, the long-term potential for a vibrant recreational
and tourist economy on a particular landscape may be compromised by
overly shortsighted resource extraction.
When economists make these assessments, the core notion of value
is benefit to people, usually measured in units of some composite
consumption good (more crudely, money). And willingness to pay is the
standard measure of value. In principle, to evaluate the social desirability
of an action one simply needs to identify all of the effects of the action, the
persons who bear the effects, and their willingness to pay. The result will
be positive if the effects of the action are beneficial to them or negative if the
effects of the action are detrimental to them. Three different sorts of benefit
or value are usually distinguished:
use value: the value of using some environmental asset at some
point in time (e.g., drilling for gas and oil)
option value: the value of having the option or opportunity to
use some environmental asset at some future point in time (e.g.,
for tourism)
existence value: the value that people place on the existence of
an environmental asset (e.g., an ecological community or a
particular species).
Notions of cost are based on the same willingness-to-pay foundation: a cost
is simply a benefit foregone. The cost of using some environmental asset
today is simply the value of the asset in its best alternative use. Thus, if the
best alternative to dense CBM well development in some part of the
province is tourism, then the foregone tourism opportunities caused (or
exacerbated) by the external effects of resource extraction are the
opportunity costs of that development.
This willingness-to-pay approach allows one to analyze and resolve
the difficult tradeoffs that inevitably arise in any policy discussion by
denominating all benefits and costs in the same willingness-to-pay currency.
The ability to evaluate and resolve these tradeoffs is the principle advantage
of the approach. With this in mind, what are the "external effects" of CBM
development, how well are current policies equipped to handle them, and
how might they be improved?
THE "EXTERNAL EFFECTS" OF CBM DEVELOPMENT
Not only are the external effects of CBM development extensive,
they pose novel issues and problems for two main reasons. First, they tend
to be less localized (or more diffused) than the comparable effects of
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conventional oil and gas development. Second, this more problematic
diffusion of effects tends to compound over time in a non-linear fashion.
Localized and Diffused Effects
Localized and diffused external effects raise quite different
management problems. The actual drilling of wells and the construction of
the road and pipeline networks to service them entail the localized nuisance
effect of dust, weeds, noise, and other effects on neighboring businesses,
residents, and ecological communities. Importantly, the localized external
effects associated with a development in one locality tend to be separable
from those associated with another development in a different locality. That
is, the nature and magnitude of the localized external effects in one locality
are independent of whether or not development occurs in a different
locality.
In varying degrees, localized external effects can be anticipated
before development, identified and measured when they occur, and
verified by outsiders after they occur. Moreover, those who bear such
localized external effects tend to anticipate or actually feel them acutely.
Information about these external effects is relatively easy to acquire, and the
incentive is strong for affected interests to become informed and to act on
the information acquired. This has implications for the kind of institutional
regime best equipped to ameliorate such external effects.
By contrast, in some circumstances, the relevant neighborhood in
which external effects operate extends so far that the external effects, no
longer meaningfully "local," are best described as diffused. This is true for
certain ecological communities, as when development closes off migration
corridors that would normally allow wildlife to move over very extensive
"neighborhoods." Similarly, when development degrades environments
valued for their natural beauty or their ability to sustain biological diversity,
such as the mountains and foothills of Alberta, the external effects are borne
in part by potential tourists from around the world.
Typically, it is extremely difficult and costly to identify those
subject to diffused external effects and, therefore, to measure those effects.
Diffuse effects are likely to be small individual by individual but quite large
when aggregated over all those who are affected. That means that those
affected, at least those humans affected, have little incentive to bring their
issues forward and no incentive at all if it is too costly. In fact, people may
very well be unaware of the effects until they actually occur.
By comparison with localized effects, information about diffused
external effects is much more difficult to acquire, and the (human)
incentives to acquire and act on them are much reduced. Again, this will
affect the design of institutions intended to manage such external effects.
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Localized external effects are much easier to deal with than diffuse external
effects.
Some aspects of CBM development can have both localized and
diffused external effects. For example, in some CBM developments, large
quantities of water, sometimes highly saline water, must be extracted to
relieve pressure and release CBM. If such water is not properly treated and
disposed of, there will be localized external effects on surface rights holders
and ecological communities in the immediate neighborhood. At the same
time, downstream impacts may extend quite far, generating diffuse external
effects.
The terms "localized" and "diffused" are relative to the scale of
analysis and may thus be used differently depending on the spatial scope
of either the substantive issues or the regulatory authority attempting to
deal with them. An effect extending over areas as large as the province of
Alberta will be "diffused" from the perspective of a particular CBM
development but will be quite "localized" from a global perspective. And
some effects of CBM development, such as those associated with carbon
emissions, involve globally diffused externalities. The neighborhood for
these effects is the entire planet. But these global issues are no different for
unconventional gas than for conventional gas and oil and will not be sorted
out at the provincial level.
Thus far, the terms "localized" and "diffused" have been used
primarily to convey their usual spatial meaning. But external effects may
also be relatively localized or diffused over time. The landscape disruption
occasioned by the construction of pipelines, for example, involves
significant external effects, but recent advances in landscape reclamation
have made these effects increasingly temporary. In effect, they are
temporally localized.
Other aspects of oil and gas development have much longer,
perhaps permanent, effects; they are temporally diffused. Obviously, the
more temporary an effect is, the less will the longer-term "option" and
"existence" values of the environmental assets be reduced by its current
"use value" for energy development. Underscoring this temporal
dimension of external effects is crucial for any notion of sustainable
development, which necessarily requires accounting for the options and
opportunities of future generations. Needless to say, if it is difficult to
adequately measure and manage external effects that are spatially diffused
to far flung living individuals, it is doubly difficult to account for the needs
of the unborn.
The Compounded Diffusion of External Effects
In the case of CBM, the temporal diffusion of external effects is
exacerbated by the fact that the typical production profile for
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unconventional gas is longer and flatter than that for conventional gas.
Interestingly, this increased temporal diffusion of external effects
compounds the spatial diffusion of the same effects. That is, to produce a
given flow of gas over an extended period of time from non-conventional
resources requires that the area devoted to extraction be several times larger
than it would be from conventional gas resources. The temporal and spatial
effects of CBM development compound each other, creating effects that are
diffused over larger areas and longer periods of time.
This compounded diffusion of effects is made even worse by the
fact that the external effects of CBM development may be non-linear,
increasing as more and more of the resource is developed. There are at least
two reasons for this. First, areas less attractive for tourism will probably be
developed first, meaning that external effects on tourism and recreation will
increase as development gradually moves into more attractive regions.
Second, and more important, as this developmental shift occurs, tourist
activities become more narrowly focused on a diminishing set of
recreational opportunities, with the result that the recreational/ tourism
experience itself is progressively congested and thus degraded, even in
areas with no CBM development. The external effects of initial CBM
development in recreationally less attractive regions will be relatively more
localized spatially than later developments in areas actually or potentially
attractive to tourist activity, and the overall diffusion of external effects will
compound in a non-linear fashion.
The compounding diffusion of external effects will be temporal and
spatial to the extent that landscape degradation is long lasting. Further, the
external effects that would be associated with extensive development of
Alberta's unconventional gas reserves will, potentially, affect many generations of future Albertans.
In essence, CBM development has significant external effects.
Moreover, not only are these effects frequently of the more difficult-tomanage diffused variety than is true of conventional gas and oil
development, but the diffusion of effects tends to compound over time and
space as development proceeds. These features of CBM development pose
novel management issues. Indeed, it is probably accurate to say that, at this
point in time, few if any Albertans have an accurate sense of possible
futures, depending on the ways in which this valuable resource is
developed and managed. And it is certainly accurate that no substantial
number of Albertans grasps the range of possible futures. Hence, any effort
to reasonably assess the diffuse external effects of development must begin
with a substantial effort to detail the range of possible futures.
It is risky to assume that the property-rights and regulatory regimes
designed for conventional oil and gas development will serve equally well
to manage the novel issues posed by CBM development. Given the
widespread distribution of the resource across Alberta, extensive
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development needs to be carefully considered and managed to avoid and
mitigate the compounded diffusion of negative externalities.
How ought these issues be approached? If the problem lies in not
taking certain undesirable effects into account because they are external to
the most immediately compelling interests and concerns of the decision
maker, then the solution may be to design institutions that will make those
effects more central to the decision maker, i.e., to cause the relevant decision
maker to "internalize" what would otherwise be an external effect. These
institutions include carefully constructed property rights, regulatory
regimes, and tax incentives.
PROPERTY RIGHTS
In a market economy, well-designed property rights will be one key
to effectively internalizing external effects. Property rights work best to
achieve this when they are exclusive and transferableby voluntary exchange.
A property right to an asset is exclusive if all benefits and costs associated
with the use of the asset accrue to the owner of the asset. External effects,
by definition, signal the failure of exclusivity. Many of the difficult issues
raised by unconventional gas development are driven by the failure of
exclusivity. In the case of localized external effects, appropriately designed
property rights can often achieve the desired internalization of external
effects.
Property Rights for Localized Effects
Two examples -International Paper (IP) and the King Ranch illustrate how property rights exclusivity internalizes external effects. In
each of these cases, landowners' property rights were exclusive with respect
to the potential benefits and costs associated with both tourism and
forestry/ agriculture, thus encouraging the commercial costs and benefits
of both to be internalized.
In the case of IP,"one of the largest timber producers in the United
States," 23 commercial accounting now focuses not just on the company's
traditional timber production but also on the potential commercial value to
be derived from recreational or tourist activities on its land. Recognizing
"that the relative values of timber and recreation had shifted and that
creating new rights for hunting and camping would increase profits for the
company.. .the company created and marketed rights to these activities, so
that by the late 1990s recreational revenues constituted 25 percent of IP's

23.

TERRY L. ANDERSON &PETRJ. HILL, THE NOT SO WILD, WILD WEST: PROPERTY RIGHTS

ON THE FRONTIER (2004).
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total profits" 24 in "the 1.2 million acres of timber-producing land in its midsouth region." 2
To realize this significant return on recreational activities, IP had to
be more careful about how and where it logged than if the recreational
alternative had not been included in its accounting. Because of its broader
accounting, IP acquired a strong incentive to log in ways that would sustain
viable habitat and recreationally desirable landscapes. The alternative ways
of deriving commercial value from the landscape - resource extraction and
tourism -turned out to be, if not complementary, at least not mutually
exclusive.
The famous King Ranch in Texas provides the second example. This
ranch, one of the largest in the world, has over time expanded its core cattle
operation into a more generalized agribusiness. Indeed, this business has
diversified beyond agriculture into industries as diverse as energy
exploration,26 publishing,27 retail, 28 and ecotourism, 29 with hunting central
to the ecotourism. 3° The point here is that, as in the case of IP, paid hunting
has become a prominent part of the King business. The Ranch's website
advertises its full 825,000 acres as "pristine wildlife habitat" on which it
sells hunting leases and by-the-day hunting opportunities. 3' Like IP, the
King Ranch has a strong incentive to conduct its other commercial activities,
such as cattle ranching, farming, and energy exploration, in ways that
sustain and enhance
the considerable income stream generated by "pristine
32
wildlife habitat."
Because both IP and the King Ranch enjoy a regulatory and
property rights context that allows them to sell not only the traditional
commercial products derived from their lands (cattle and lumber) but
recreational opportunities such as hunting, they have a serious stake in
accounting for these different ways of deriving value and in optimizing the
balance between them. Had the legal framework prohibited them from
selling the relevant tourism opportunities, the recreational cost of less

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. King Ranch, The Legacy: The End of the War and Building a Business,
http://www.king-ranch.com/end of-thewar.html.
27. King Ranch, King Ranch Operations: Kingsville Publishing, http://www.kingranch.com/publishinghtm.
28. King Ranch, King Ranch Operations: Robstown Hardware Company,
http://www.king-ranch.com/robstown.html.
29. King Ranch, Stewardship and Education, http://www.king-ranch.com/ stewardship
_overview.html.
30. King Ranch, Hunting: Hunting on the Ranch, http://www.king-ranch.com/hunting
_overview.html.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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environmentally sensitive ways of conducting other aspects of their
businesses would have been an "external effect" for these companies. For
example, if IP had conducted indiscriminate clear cutting, the cost would
have been borne by others, including unborn generations whose aesthetic
and recreational opportunities would have been curtailed, including those
who may have sought an opportunity for recreational commerce.
Because costs that are internalized are taken most seriously, the
full-cost accounting required for sustainable development is most likely
when the relevant decision maker effectively internalizes all of the costs and
benefits. IP and the King Ranch internalized the relevant costs and benefits
because they "owned" and could thus sell recreational opportunities. The
situation, however, is more complex in the case of subsurface mineral and
energy resources, where the exclusivity principle of property rights is often
breached.
In Alberta, subsurface mineral rights are often owned by the public
and managed on its behalf by the government, even if the surface rights are
privately owned. The government typically sells exploration rights to third
parties. Where surface and subsurface rights are fragmented in this way
and no exclusive property right exists with respect to the relevant activities,
it is trickier to determine the best decision maker (or decision-making
process) to internalize and balance the costs and benefits of relevant
alternatives.
Whether Alberta should undo the fragmentation of surface and
subsurface rights in the case of private freeholds may be worth assessing;
however, even if that were desirable or possible, the solution would not
address the vast bulk of land, which is not fragmented. Complicating the
situation even further is the fact that some public lands are leased to
farmers and ranchers, creating a hybrid kind of situation. Given widespread
public ownership, the internalized full accounting of costs and benefits no
doubt requires an appropriately designed public regulatory process. First,
however, an evaluation of the policies that currently apply to private
freeholds and leaseholds must be performed. That is, the questions must be
asked: to what extent does our current policy mix encourage the
internalization of external effects, and how might its capacity to do so be
improved?
Even where the relevant property rights are fragmented, a property
rights regime can be devised to achieve some salutary internalization of the
external effects of development. This occurs where external effects are
focused on a small number of identifiable parties, the policy regime requires
all parties to come to agreement on any development, and side payments
between the parties are allowed. Internalization of the external effects of
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development occurs to the extent
that those who bear the external effect
33
receive compensation for it.
Alberta approximates such a regime because the landowner or
leaseholder who controls the surface rights to land on which development
occurs can demand and receive compensation for disruption of farming/
ranching activities, noise, aesthetic decline, etc. under the Surface Rights
Act.' On the other hand, the landowner/leaseholder cannot necessarily
prevent access altogether. If the petroleum lessee is unable to negotiate a
surface lease, a right of entry order may be obtained from the Surface Rights
Board, which considers concerns of the surface rights holder and the
appropriate amount of compensation for surface access to drill the well. If
a strict property rights framework implies a strong veto over development
access onto one's land, this is a "soft" veto, subject to regulatory override.
Nevertheless, it is strong enough to provide the incentive needed to give the
landowner/leaseholder some leverage to obtain compensatory payment
and an incentive to negotiate an agreement. An important open question in
our minds is whether or not a strong veto might be more appropriate.
The incentive to welcome energy exploration on private land and
leaseholds is further strengthened under marginal farming/ranching
conditions, where selling access to resource exploration can often bring a
welcome income boost. For example, an Alberta rancher in Woodlands
County who receives $1200 per well concedes that "you can't make that
amount of money by farming [the] land" taken up by a wellsite. 35 Elsewhere
in the province landowners receive $2500 per well, 3 which can amount to
quite an income boost if several wells are drilled on a property.37
In effect, this allocation of property rights facilitates a negotiated
solution where energy development occurs after those who hold surface
and subsurface rights have come to an agreement after weighing relevant
costs and benefits. A significant advantage of negotiated solutions of this
sort is that a regulator or referee need not anticipate, measure, and attach
value to these external effects. Instead, the activities are devolved to the

33. This insight is usually attributed to Ronald Coase, who was awarded the 1991 Nobel
Prize in Economics for his work on property rights and transaction costs. See, e.g., Ronald
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
34. RSA 2000, c. S-24, §§ 1, 25(1).
35. Hanneke Brooymans, Coal Front: Is Coalbed Methane Alberta's Next Energy Boon, or
Another Environmental Boondoggle?, ALBERTA VIEWS, July/Aug. 2004, at 46.
36. Id. at 47
37. Other kinds of energy developments can similarly become attractive revenue sources
for farmers and ranchers, as in Denmark, where farmers consider the payments for the
construction of wind turbines to be a cash crop and therefore favor having them installed on
their land. Chris Turner, Fantasy Islands, Two Postcard-perfectDanish Islands May Finally Be
Making Eco-warriorDreams a SustainableReality, ENROUTE, Mar. 2006, at 90.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 47

parties that have the incentive to get it right and that actually bear the
effects.
The fact that those who own or control surface rights on lands
where wells are developed must be compensated for the external effects of
energy exploration is a laudable development. The current compensation
scheme, however, is not without its perversities. For example, landowners
and leaseholders are paid for the amount of disturbance to their land,
effectively a per-well system of compensation. This creates an incentive that
favors more wells while disincentivizing technologies that minimize the
number of wells, such as directional drilling. On the one hand, the Alberta
Energy and Utilities Board (EUB) sees "drilling multiple wells from a single
surface location" as a matter of "good land use" and an option to be "highly
encouraged" in discussions with landowners. 38 On the other hand, one
company CEO reports that "'landowners will get snarky with us if we say
we want to drill directionally,"' 39 because, being paid by the well, they
stand to lose money from this environmentally friendly technology.
The perverse incentive of the compensation rules tends to multiply
well sites unnecessarily not only on any particular property but across local
properties. Brooymans reports that a landowner who would rather have
avoided energy exploration on her land did not "think we had a choice." 4'
Since the energy companies "were coming anyway,"" she observed, why
should her family put up with all the costs associated with nearby
developments while their more energy-friendly neighbors reaped the
financial benefits? 42 Better to invite the companies on to one's own land as
well.
To make matters worse, Alberta's property rights regime facilitates
negotiated settlements only between the developer and the freehold
landowner who holds the mineral rights where direct development will
occur. The regime does not provide for the localized external effects
imposed on neighboring properties that do not host development. To
address the latter issue, Alberta's policy framework shifts from property
rights to a regulatory process under which landowners within a specified
radius of a proposed development have standing to raise concerns and
represent their interests. The developer must attempt to resolve any
conflicts that arise, subject to supervision and ultimate disposition by the
EUB.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

EUB, EnerFAQsl0, supra note 19, at 3.
Brooymans, supra note 35, at 47 (quoting Michael Gatens).
Id. at 46 (quoting Irene Olson).
Id.
Id.
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Missing from that process is the powerful incentive that sustains
effective negotiation in a property rights framework: the right of the owner
of surface rights on neighboring lands to negotiate before development an
agreement pertaining to external effects. While adjacent landowners may
rely on the common law torts of nuisance or negligence law for compensation when CBM development has negative quantifiable environmental
impacts, in practice this remedy is rarely selected because of the costs of
litigation and the asymmetric incentives in any such situation.43
The problem of external effects on other properties in the local
neighborhood is best handled by an extension of the property rights
approach in which all parties with surface rights within the designated
radius of the development have the same kind of transferable veto over
development held by the actual development property. Before development, the developer would be obligated to negotiate an agreement with all
owners within some development radius. The agreement would provide for
the addressing of development problems.
Consider water quality issues. In some of the western states, water
well impact agreements should provide for monitoring water well quality
at regular intervals and for compensation to be paid to the landowner or
surface rights holder in the event that water quality deteriorates. Other
agreements that protect adjacent landowners from other impacts (such as
noise) should also be considered.
This approach would broaden the internalization of the costs and
benefits of development throughout the relevant locality by giving
neighbors the same leverage to negotiate compensation for negative
external effects. In principle, the situation faced by developers under such
a regime would be no different from the problem real estate developers face
when they set out to assemble a block of land held by a number of owners,
or the problem that the aggressor in a hostile takeover bid for a public
company encounters. As in the case of the site owners, the neighbors' veto
could be made "soft" enough to allow a particularly intransigent minority
to be overridden in the public interest at appeal, but "hard" enough that
negotiated settlement is generally preferable to regulatory appeal.
The desired result is a process that is more streamlined from the
regulatory point of view and that relies more heavily on negotiated
settlement among the affected parties. Among many other benefits, the
possibility of negotiated compensation for properties without well sites
might weaken their incentive to attract additional, superfluous wells. More
complex regulatory processes have a role to play in addressing diffused

43. Since typically the developer is involved in many such situations and the land owner
just one or a few.
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external effects, but property rights solutions have clear advantages in the
case of localized effects.
In addition to extending the scope of negotiated solutions to more
affected landowners, rules should allow landowners to internalize all of the
relevant external effects. Currently, such a scheme is hampered by the legal
inability to sell the kind of hunting and fishing access that, as noted above,
induces IP or the King Ranch to engage in more strategic logging and
agriculture. For many farmers and ranchers in Alberta, hunting is the kind
of recreational activity to weigh and balance against energy exploration and
marginal agriculture.' Certainly, the experience of other jurisdictions shows
that vibrant economies can emerge to serve this interest.
But Alberta's farmers and ranchers are in precisely the situation
hypothesized above in which IPwas unable to sell recreational rights. For
IP,such a situation would favor more indiscriminate clear cutting. For
Alberta's farmers and ranchers, it adds to the incentive for unnecessary
energy-related land disturbance, and the costs in lost tourism opportunities
imposed by certain energy-development strategies remain "external
effects." For IP and the King Ranch, on the other hand, the costs are
"internalized."
The negative "external effects" are not only lost opportunities for
local farmers and ranchers, but also for other local businesses that could
serve the more extensive tourist trade that might otherwise arise.
Ultimately, these external effects are borne by unknown numbers of
potential tourists worldwide, both now and in the future. In this sense, they
take us beyond localized to diffused external effects. Interestingly, although
property rights are not as readily applicable to these situations, they can
play an important role as proxies for diffused external effects.
Property Rights as Proxies for Diffused External Effects
As noted, diffused external effects raise significant informational
issues because the innumerable parties are difficult to identify and often
will not self-identify and participate because their individual stakes are
small as compared to the significant aggregate impact. In some cases, this
difficulty can be partly overcome by relying on entrepreneurial proxies for
the many diffuse parties. This is a feasible strategy when diffused external
effects on far flung individuals are reflected in the profits of firms that
provide various goods and services that are complementary to the affected
environmental assets. There are, for example, a variety of different sorts of

44. Skiing, hiking, recreational activities, and industries are already represented
differently within national and provincial parks and are not as viable an option in many
farming and ranching areas.
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firms that provide services to tourists, such as restaurants, motels, gas
stations, curio shops, guiding services, and so forth. Moreover, farmer/
rancher landowners can in principle provide some of these services
themselves and thus be an effective proxy.
These services, in effect, combine with environmental assets to
produce the valued experience, tourism in this case. Typically the firms that
provide these complementary services are easier to identify than the
ultimate users, are smaller in number by orders of magnitude, and are often
quite specialized in that the quality and quantity of the relevant
environmental assets is a matter of great concern to them. Profits earned by
hunting and fishing guides, to cite the most obvious example, are largely
determined by the quality and quantity of the game and fish that the
environment provides. These firms are potentially one important source of
information on the significance of external effects. Because they can be
identified, are relatively small in number, and have a significant stake in the
quality and quantity of the relevant environmental assets, the task of getting
reliable information about the value of the diffused external effects of
development on them is more manageable. However, they capture only a
part of the value to ultimate users, so the effect on their profits of a
particular development is a lower bound on the true value of the diffused
external effects of the development.
Acquiring the relevant information from many of these proxies, to
say nothing of the potential ultimate users, poses difficulties that cannot
often be solved by property rights. Reflection on IP and the King Ranch,
however, shows that appropriately designed landowner property rights can
be part of the solution if the landowner can sell them, such as recreational
opportunities like hunting and fishing. It is worth exploring further why
this does not occur in Alberta and what might be done to remedy the
situation.
Significantly, the situations of the energy and the hunting/fishing
economies in Alberta are rooted in the same conceptual starting point. As
in the case of subsurface resources, the public typically retains ownership
of the wild animals that roam the surface. Here, too, exploitation rights
(hunting and fishing licenses) are sold to third parties, with the landowner
suffering real costs. Unlike subsurface resources, the very presence of
certain game animals can impose significant costs on farmers and ranchers.
For example, deer and elk herds can significantly reduce a ranch's
carrying capacity for cattle. In itself, this might provide an incentive to
welcome hunters. The overall impact of modern hunting on herd size is
often negligible, however, and is offset by what a 1971 study prepared for
the Western Stock Growers Association referred to as an annual invasion
"by an army of hunters [the landowner] cannot control, with all the inherent
risks of fire, damage to fences, wounding of livestock and disruption of
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productive activities on the farm or ranch." 5 Under these circumstances, the
farmer or rancher may calculate that it is better to reduce herd size by
minimizing suitable wildlife habitat.
Meanwhile, hunters persist in the illusion that, aside from license
fees paid to the government, the publicly owned resource in game "is
costless and consequently must be free."' Among other things, this is taken
to mean that hunters and fishers cannot be charged a fee by the landowners
who allow them to hunt and fish. In fact, this perception is embedded in
Alberta policy, which makes it "unlawful to directly or indirectly buy or
sell, trade or barter, or offer to buy or sell access to any land for the purpose
of hunting any big game, furbearing animals or game birds.. .except under
authority of a Game Bird Shooting Ground License."47
The result, observes the Western Stock Growers Report, is highly
ironic: while the landowner's economic interest pays him "to assault the
game population on the habitat side[,] the Government of Alberta collects
[significant funds] from hunters intent on gaining access to somebody's
land in order that they might collect their 'free' game." 48 Under these
circumstances, many landowners view hunting as an unmitigated cost and
one they can avoid. In contrast to the case of subsurface resources, where
the Surface Rights Board can impose access rights over landowner
objections, landowners can prohibit hunting and fishing access altogether
and without question.
In sum, an important asymmetry exists in the incentive structures
confronting landowners vis-A-vis the two different kinds of publicly owned
resources on or under their land. In the case of subsurface resources,
landowners and leaseholders can charge for access and, given the prospect
of an imposed agreement, have strong incentives to do so. In the case of
wildlife, by contrast, since landowners are legally unable to realize any of
the value associated with hunting and fishing, they can at least avoid its
costs by closing off all access.
The result of these opposing incentive structures is to give
landowners a positive stake in energy exploration and a negative stake in
the local hunting and fishing economy. Other things being equal, they can
thus be expected to cooperate in the expanding energy economy while at
the same time contributing to the decline (or preventing the effective
launch) of the hunting and fishing economy. They are definitely not put in
an IP- or King Ranch-like position of having to weigh and balance the

45. J. Paul Hedlin & Ralph Hedlin, Game Policy Needs in Alberta 5 (1971) (a study
prepared for the W. Stock Growers' Ass'n).
46. Id.
47. Alberta Outdoorsmen, General Regulations, Hunting Privileges on Occupied, Private
and Public Land, http://www.albertaoutdoorsmen.ca/huntingregs/genregs.html.
48. Hedlin & Hedlin, supra note 45.
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opportunities for realizing value from both kinds of economy. On the
contrary, for landowners at least, the playing field is strongly tilted toward
the energy economy and away from the hunting and fishing economy.
Allowing landowners to realize value from both kinds of land
access would level the playing field. In the IPexample, IP's ability to reap
recreational value from its lands will not lead it to abandon the forestry
business. Given its real incentive to weigh and balance the two ways of
realizing value, and assuming that both offer significantly attractive
prospects, IPwill be strongly motivated to try to find an optimal balance of
both. Not only will a landowner who can realize value from both energy
exploration and tourism be strongly inclined to do so, he also brings to the
table a strong incentive to ensure that the energy-exploration side of his
portfolio is conducted in ways that will not undermine the tourism side. A
landowner with positive incentives on both sides of the ledger might, for
example, be more favorably inclined toward the well-minimizing strategy
of directional drilling, even under the perverse incentive of per-well
payments,49 if the foregone income from "extra wells" could be treated as
a revenue-generating investment in tourism. Depending on the kind of
hunting and the size of the hunting party, one or two days of paid hunting
can easily surpass the annual income of a single well-site access
agreement.50
The highly desirable goal of "sustainable energy, environment, and
economy" requires balance. Achieving such balance means that those with
a stake in its different sides and dimensions must be involved in the
decision-making process. This means that representatives of each side - e.g.,
energy companies and environmental groups -should be at the table. But
the chances of finding an optimal balance will be improved by the
participation of those who have a simultaneous stake in the alternative sides
of the equation and thus a personal interest in optimizing the mix.
Landowners/leaseholders surely belong in this category, but they cannot
make their best contribution unless public policy unlocks their capacity to
have a real stake in the alternative ways of realizing value from their land.
The resulting improvement in the capacity of larger landowners to
find creative ways of diversifying their operations is environmentally
desirable not only because it can be expected to have a positive influence on
the inevitable balancing of "sustainable energy, environment, and
economy," but also because it may contribute to the long-term viability of

49. Though this perverse incentive might itself be revisited.
50. Reported per-well payments range from $1200 to $2500 per annum. Consider that a
three-day deer hunt at the King Ranch costs a minimum of $5500 per person, and may range
up to $20,000 depending on the quality of the trophy bagged. Similarly, a quail hunt costs
$450 per day per person. See King Ranch, Hunting, Pricing Info and Booking Status,
http://www.king-ranch.com/pricing.html.
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larger private landholdings in environmentally sensitive but recreationally
attractive landscapes. This in itself has important environmental benefits.
The fact is that landowners face more than just the two alternative nonagricultural ways of realizing value thus far discussed. In recreationally
attractive regions, they can also gradually fragment their holdings, selling
off small parcels of land at high prices. This is a perfectly understandable
and rational strategy, especially since it is often the route to comfortable
retirement for cash-poor but land-rich agriculturalists whose children
choose not to follow a similarly cash-poor lifestyle. It should be noted that
the desire to maintain the option of selling parcels of land is itself a reason
to oppose the kind of extensive energy development that might well lower
the price that recreationalists are willing to pay. But protecting land from
energy exploration primarily to preserve it for eventual residential
fragmentation has its own significant environmental costs. The problems of
access roads and other kinds of habitat disturbance that come with energy
exploration also come with residential/recreational fragmentation.
A land use mix in which large land holdings continue to play a role
may achieve the best balance of environmental, commercial, and
recreational values. But at least in regions dominated by private ownership,
such a mix is likely to persist in the long term only if large landholdings in
environmentally sensitive but recreationally attractive landscapes can be
economically viable. Given the economic difficulties often facing purely
agricultural operations on such landscapes (which tend to be agriculturally
marginal for reasons closely related to their recreational attractiveness), the
viability of large landholdings may well depend on a strategy of mixed
diversification, like the one that has helped sustain the King Ranch as a
commercially successful large land holding. Income derived from energy
exploration is likely to play an important part in such a strategy, as it has in
King's case. Such exploration on a landholding might well make it
somewhat less attractive to prospective buyers of small parcels, but, if well
managed, might be perfectly compatible with income from a vibrant
hunting and fishing economy. Overly dense energy development might kill
even that prospect, but more carefully designed development (with fewer
wells using directional drilling, say) might optimize the balance of both
kinds of "diversification income."
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION
The advantage of property rights is that they facilitate negotiated
agreements among interested parties and thus do not require state
intervention. Although more difficult in the case of diffused external effects,
appropriately designed property rights can incentivize landowners to act
directly as meaningful proxies for the external effects borne by far flung
interests. Related property rights might have similar effects. For example,
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outfitters are often allocated quotas of hunting licenses, in effect a kind of
property right that gives them an important stake in outcomes and makes
them an important source of relevant information.
However, while the potential of property rights should be as fully
explored as possible, they will not be the entire solution for a number of
reasons. First, much of Alberta's landscape is not privately held, meaning
that even under ideal property rights regimes, private landowners and
leaseholders will not be adequate proxies for the full range of diffused
external effects. Appropriately designed property rights on public lands for
outfitters and guides may help, but a wide range of other tourist service
firms such as restaurants and motels are also important proxies, and they
will not tend to have this kind of property right. Simply put, diffused
external effects can be so large that negotiations among interested parties
with well-defined property rights will go only so far. This means that some
public regulatory process is also necessary.
One challenge for any regulatory process is gathering the relevant
information about diffused external effects. How is information obtained
from unknown numbers of widely dispersed tourists? Moreover, how is
good information obtained from entrepreneurial proxies in the tourist
service industry?
A common answer is some kind of "stakeholder consultation
process" that gives various interests in addition to the site owners an
opportunity to be heard. In fact, a stakeholder consultation process"
currently exists, but it is designed mainly to address localized external
effects, not diffused effects. The process allows neighboring interests to be
heard and is strongly biased against exceeding local focus.
In Stage 1 of this five-stage process, the developer, or applicant,
communicates to the public a detailed description of the project, which
includes the identification of potential impacts of the project and a
discussion of alternative ways of mitigating the impacts. Parties with an
interest in the project must respond to the initial announcement within 14
days.
In Stage 2, the developer initiates a participant involvement
program. Participants include all parties with a direct interest in the land,
those who have the right to conduct activities on the land, and possibly
other parties who express interest in the project. Parties within a specified
radius of the proposed development are deemed to be participants.
Pursuant to the Alberta Energy and Utility Board (EUB) guidelines,
individuals who are unable to show a reasonable and direct connection
between the proposed development and the rights or interests they believe
to be affected or individuals who are not affected in a different way or to a
greater degree than members of the general public have no standing in the
process.
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In Stage 3, the developer is obliged to identify and, if possible,
resolve conflicts that arise in Stage 2.In Stage 4, unresolved concerns are
addressed either through an appeal process or through a formal EUB
hearing. In Stage 5, the EUB issues its disposition of the application, and the
applicant informs participants in the process of the disposition.
Clearly, this process is not well designed to handle diffused
external effects. It more or less explicitly excludes parties with a diffused
interest in the project. The fact that it is initiated by the developer, the short
timelines envisioned in the process, and the EUB guidelines regarding who
ought to have standing in the process rule out meaningful participation by
members of the general public who might have quite legitimate interests in
the project."1
Moreover, because the process deals with development on a
project-by-project basis, people who bear diffused effects have only a
limited possibility of representing their interests and a very limited
incentive to do so, even if they were granted standing. Residents of
Edmonton or Calgary are quite unlikely to be aware of a particular proposal
for development in the Porcupine Hills, and even if they are aware of it, the
costs of representing their interests may very well be simply too onerous.
Indeed, their interest would appear to be not in particular projects but in the
pattern of development of much larger regions, such as the Cypress Hills,
the Highway 22 Corridor, or others.
In essence, the current stakeholder process emphasizes the wrong
problems, localized external effects, which are better handled by improved
property rights mechanisms. The process needs to be modified to better
address the problem of diffused effects. This article is not the place to detail
alternative models for such a process, but it does seem appropriate to
comment briefly on some features of a workable process.
To insure that diffused interests are represented, the process ought
to consider development on a region-by-region basis. It ought to be initiated
and driven not by developers but by some public body, preferably one that
is independent of departments with strong existing interests in energy
development. Any party or collection of parties willing to incur the costs of
representing their interests ought to have standing in the process.5 2
Government departments could also be included among the
participants. In fact, it might be desirable to require that key departments
like Energy, Sustainable Resource Development, and Tourism participate

51. Because, for example, they vacation in the affected area, or they anticipate that their
children will want to use the area for recreational purposes, or they value the existence of
wildlife in the area.
52. On the question of how non-governmental and non-corporate interests might afford
such representation, see the section on "Voluntary Contingent Taxes," infra.
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in the process. Some body or group should be charged with the
responsibility of producing a state-of-the-art contingentvaluationstudy to aid
in the assessment of diffused external effects of different development
scenarios for the region. The outcome of the process ought not perhaps be
a development plan for the region but rather a set of guidelines for energy
development in the particular region, including permissible well densities,
guidelines concerning access to and decommissioning of roads built for
development, and the identification and protection of particularly sensitive
areas.
VOLUNTARY CONTINGENT TAXES (VCT)
As previously discussed, diffused external effects raise difficult
measurement issues, especially when the effects are not associated with the
use of the environmental resource in question. If, for example, the very
existence of a pristine environment is valued by people who do not use the
environment, they will be difficult to identify. Even if they can be identified,
standard contingent valuation techniques may not accurately measure the
value they place on the environment and the extent to which particular
insults to the environment degrade that value.
The core problem with contingent valuation techniques is one of
preference revelation. If a person is simply asked to reveal her willingness
to pay to prevent some particular insult to the environment, she has no
obvious reason to carefully assess her willingness to pay and no clear
incentive to accurately report it. In fact, if she sees any causal connection
between her reported value and the likelihood that the insult will be
avoided, she has an incentive to inflate her willingness to pay.
Where applicable, property rights approaches are preferred
precisely because they avoid the preference revelation problem. Owners of
property rights and others who would like to acquire them have good
reason to carefully assess the value of the rights to them, and obvious
incentives to forge a bargain in which the party that places the largest value
on the rights either acquires or retains them.
Recent theoretical and experimental work on charitable donations
and the private provision of public goods suggests that in certain
circumstances one can solve the preference revelation problem using a
voluntary, contingent tax mechanism (VCT). Further, schemes of this sort
have been tried in the field, and although the evidence is mixed, the results
are encouraging.
To fix ideas, consider a public good, perhaps some conservation
project, that costs say $10,000 and provides benefits to 100 people. The
value of the public good to person i is simply a number, v i. The sum over
all 100 people of these values is their aggregate willingness to pay for the
public good, V= v i. If V exceeds the $10,000 cost of the public good, then

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 47

the willingness to pay logic implies that the good ought to be provided, and
if V is less than $10,000 it ought not to be provided.
Now suppose that these 100 people have the opportunity to pay a
voluntary, contingent tax to pay for the public good, likely in an identified
line on their tax return. Specifically, imagine that each person chooses her
own contribution, ti for individual i. The individual's tax is voluntary in that
she chooses the amount to contribute, and it is contingent in that the
designated amount will be tapped only if the total contribution, T=E t1 , is
at least $10,000- that is, only if there is enough in the fund to provide the
good. Further, in the event that T exceeds $10,000, imagine that the excess
will be redistributed to individuals and that shares of individuals are
proportional to their contributions. Rebates for unsuccessful projects (those
that fail to generate the required level of funding), or for contributions in
excess of requirements, could be handled in a number of ways -for
example, as a tax credit in the following year.
Projects would come forward through a process of citizen
participation. A project's eligibility for inclusion on the tax form would be
dependent on preliminary contingent contributions by citizens amounting
to some specified percentage (25%, for example) of the target amount.
The mechanism may create some added competition in the bidding
for energy development rights in particular areas. Oil companies bid on
these rights because they can make money. A coalition of citizens could bid
on them to prevent oil companies from getting them or to impose their own
conditions on development. Additionally, intervenor funding for
neighboring landowners may assist them in preparing for meaningful
participation in the stakeholder consultation process.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, CBM is a potentially valuable energy resource in Alberta,
but its development raises a number of thorny issues that must be managed
effectively if the provincial government is to optimize the use of all natural
resources. First is the very magnitude of the resource. It is distributed across
virtually the entire southern half of the province.
Second is the fact that CBM well densities are considerably higher
than in conventional gas fields. The net result is that CBM development can
have a much larger surface footprint. Thus, the potential for conflicts among
competing uses of land and water resources is far greater with CBM than
it has been with conventional natural gas.
Further, at this point in time, there is considerable uncertainty
about the nature of these conflicts and how best to manage them. Indeed,
it is probably accurate to say that few if any residents have a clear sense of
the possible futures, depending on the manner in which this valuable
energy resource is developed and managed. And it is certainly accurate that
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a minority of provincial residents grasp the range of possible futures.
Hence, prudence demands that a substantial research effort detail the range
of possible futures, this article's first recommendation.
Given the nature of the issues posed by CBM development, parts
of the regulatory framework that have served the province so well for
conventional gas development may not be appropriate for future CBM
development. Using the standard economics framework that focuses on
localized and diffused external effects of development, this article has
assessed the suitability of existing institutions for CBM development and
explored modifications to them by focusing on property rights and
stakeholder consultation.
The potential of CBM as a Canadian energy resource, and the fact
that its development can have significant land impacts, the diffused external
effects of development on ecosystems and in particular wildlife and the
associated recreational and tourism opportunities can be very significant.
It is, of course, difficult to assess with any precision the magnitude of these
effects. In light of the importance of these activities to residents and the
provincial government's commitment to sustainable development, an effort
must be made to address the issues raised in this article. Under the current
regulatory process, there is no effective way to assess diffused effects. It
seems that a new, inclusive stakeholder process that focuses on development on a region-by-region basis is necessary. In particular, it should be
open and include a state of the art contingent valuation study; various
departments of government like Energy, Sustainable Resources, and
Tourism with a stake in the outcome should make representations; and the
process should not be based in any of these departments.
It may also be desirable to devise a new institution that would
facilitate voluntary contingent taxes as a way of assessing diffused effects
external effects and raising money for a variety of public good/environmental purposes. An institution of this sort could play a valuable role in a
number of areas outside energy and environment.
It is also clear that the localized external effects associated with
development are more significant for the CBM resource than for the
conventional gas resource. Localized external effects are best handled by
property rights, and the current system goes some distance in this direction
but not all the way. Efforts should be undertaken to extend the
internalization by property rights in a number of areas. Under Alberta's
current property rights regime, in the battle for land use, no one speaks
effectively for alternative uses of private or public lands that involve
hunting and other recreational pursuits. In particular, farmers and ranchers
have no positive stake in these activities even though their decisions with
respect to land use and access determine in significant measure the realized
value of these activities. As a result, the interests of farmers and ranchers
are inappropriately tipped toward energy development. Efforts should be
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undertaken to rectify this situation by enhancing the property rights of
farmers and ranchers.
Given the increased density of CBM wells, localized external effects
on neighboring properties will also be more significant in the future.
Currently the regulatory system and the courts are beginning to address
these effects; however, given the litigation costs and the asymmetry of the
typical situation, litigation is not the most efficient or effective remedy.
Instead, there should be meaningful consultation with neighboring
landowners and a legal requirement that agreements be negotiated between
CBM developers and adjacent landowners before CBM drilling proceeds.

